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I. INTRODUCTION
While federal and state government regulations have become
commonplace in almost every conceivable facet of the modem American
lifestyle, the prison food system has inconspicuously remained under-
regulated despite the progress made by the prisoners' rights movement in
other areas.' Legislatures in most states generally leave prison food
regulation to the sole discretion of prison administrators, resulting in a
"laissez-faire approach" in the prison food system; an anachronism in
contemporary America.2 Some states' prison systems do in fact self-
regulate to an adequate degree despite this under-regulation, while others
participate in voluntary, nongovernmental prison accreditation programs.3
However, many states and localities are not so magnanimous. Serious
issues concerning the nature and quality of food offered to prison inmates
arise when these governments do not participate in such programs or
simply choose to ignore the programs' provisions at their convenience, due
4to their voluntary nature. As an example of the potential for abuse that can
occur when prison food systems are under-regulated, the state of Illinois
initiated a large scale plan to substitute meat with soy-based products for
budgetary reasons in 2003, resulting in a multitude of health related
complaints from its inmates, including digestive disorders, skin problems,
and even breast development in males.' As such, while there may not
necessarily be a nationwide prison pandemic that poses a threat to every
1. Clifford M. Hardin, The Effects of Over-Regulation, 34 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
50, 50 (1979) (noting that "the increased involvement of government ... is affecting
nearly all walks of life in America today").
2. Cyrus Naim, Prison Food Law 1 (Spring 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://dash.harvard.edu /handle/1/8848245 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
3. Dale K. Sechrest, The Accreditation Movement in Corrections, 40 FED.
PROBATION 15, 17 (1976).
4. AM. CORRECTIONAL Ass'N, AGENCY MANUAL OF ACCREDITATION: POLICY AND
PROCEDURE 50-51 (2012), available at https://www.aca.org/standards/pdfs/
AccreditationPolicyProcedure.pdf (explaining that the only penalty for a violation is
revocation of accreditation and that accreditation can be granted again after a violation
following a 180-day waiting period).
5. Kimberly Hartke, Budget Shortfalls Hit Illinois Prison Diet, WESTON A. PRICE
FOUND., July 19, 2010, http://westonaprice.org/press/budget-shortfalls-hit-illinois-
prison-diet.
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inmate in the U.S., it is clear that the issues involved are serious and impact
a significant portion of the inmate population.6
Further, one must understand that these issues tend to manifest
primarily in state prisons, as a comprehensive system of standards
promulgated and enforced by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, complete with
the input and oversight of registered dietitians, regulates the federal prison
system.' So, while the concerns at issue here may not be applicable to
prisoners in federal penitentiaries, many inmates are incarcerated in state
prisons that choose not to self-regulate or are overly lax regarding
enforcement when they do self-regulate.
This article will illustrate the need for pervasive regulation in the U.S.
prison food system, focusing primarily on state penitentiaries. Section II
begins by demonstrating the adverse effects of an under-regulated prison
food system on those incarcerated within our nation's state prisons, as
bottom-line budgetary concerns are permitted to reign supreme. Section III
then surveys the primary remedial tool available to inmates who feel they
have been provided inadequate nourishment, litigation, and seeks to
demonstrate why it is wholly insufficient as a curative mechanism. Next,
section IV uses federal regulations in the realm of public school lunches as
a paradigm for crafting appropriate regulations in the prison food system.
Finally, section V addresses the practical limitations of implementing these
proposed regulations and suggests how they might be mitigated.
II. FOOD DEFICIENCIES IN STATE PRISONS
Surely, regulation for the sake of regulation in the face of no true and
pervasive problem produces the potential for tremendous economic waste.8
As such, if the lack of food regulation in prisons does not lead to
cognizable and verifiable health risks to the inmates housed in these
facilities on a meaningful scale, it would be imprudent to impose them.9
6. See generally David M. Reutter, Gary Hunter & Brandon Sample, Appalling
Prison and Jail Food Leaves Prisoners Hungry for Justice, 21 PRISON LEGAL NEWS 1
(2010).
7. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, MANAGEMENT OF FOOD ALLERGIES - CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINES 1 (2012), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/mgmt
_food allergies.pdf.
8. Satish Joshi, Ranjani Krishnan & Lester Lave, Estimating the Hidden Costs of
Environmental Regulation, 76 ACCT. REV. 171, 194-95 (2001) (contending that
government regulation has a substantial impact on prices in the steel mill industry,
concluding that the associated hidden costs of regulation are eight to ten times the
visible costs at the margin).
9. Christian Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What
Incarceration Costs Taxpayers, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE 1, 8 (2012), available at http://
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This is because taxpayers would ultimately bear the increased "hidden
costs" of regulation to fund a sector of the government that already faces
significant budgetary unrest.10 However, it is empirically clear that in the
absence of some agency with actual enforcement power presiding over
offending prisons, administrators and contractors are motivated to cut
corners with food quality, often leading to infirmity in their inmates.
A. Aramark's Bottom Line
Perhaps the best illustration of the tendency for prison meals to fall
short of generally accepted nutritional standards in the absence of proper
regulation is the litany of complaints and allegations brought over the past
several decades against Aramark Correctional Services (Aramark).
Aramark is a private food contractor responsible for distributing over one
million meals per day to inmates across the country.H Aramark's business
model has resulted in incidents of unsanitary conditions, insufficient
portions of food, and inadequate nutritional provisions in at least nineteen
states.1 In addition, numerous inmates have brought lawsuits against
Aramark challenging its food service practices. Such infractions range
from altering expiration dates on food to instructing its employees
responsible for dispensing food to do so parsimoniously, intentionally
providing inmates less than the required serving in an effort to increase
profits. 14 For example, Aramark contracts with the state of Pennsylvania to
provide food services to Northampton County Prison.15  In 2005, city
inspector Ed Ferraro discovered that the prison stored food in a bathroom,
did not have hot water or soap for kitchen workers to wash hands, and used
refrigerators not cold enough to safely store food. 16 In fact, Ferraro stated
www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Price-of Prisons-updated versi
on_072512.pdf.
10. Id. (noting that of the forty states surveyed, all exceeded the corrections budget
by an average of 13.9%).
11. ARAMARK, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, http://www.aramark.com/Industries/
Correctionallnstitutions/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
12. John E. Dannenberg, Aramark: Prison Food Service with a Bad Aftertaste, 17
PRISON LEGAL NEWS 1, 10 (2006).
13. See generally, e.g., McRoy v. Aramark Correctional Serv., Inc., 268 Fed.App'x
479 (7th Cir. 2008); Drake v. Velasco, 207 F. Supp.2d 809 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Horton v.
Sheriff of Cook Cnty., No. 11 C 6064, 2012 WL 5838183 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2012).
14. Dannenberg, supra note 12, at 10.
15. Paul Muschick & Christopher Schnaars, Easton: Prison Kept Food Unsafely,
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that would have asked the owner to close the facility if he found the same
conditions in a private business' kitchen."
Further, due to the often extreme disparity between Aramark's bid
offers and those of its competitors, it seems clear that Aramark employs
these tactics with the sole intention of improving its bottom line., 8 For
example, a Florida inspector general's cost-value analysis of its contract
with Aramark found that Aramark pocketed a $10.5 million windfall in
Florida alone by charging for meals it never served and by incorporating
cheaper ingredients into recipes despite explicit instructions forbidding this
practice. 19  Ultimately, the report recommended terminating Florida's
contract with Aramark, primarily because Aramark failed to meet its
expectations of "maintaining the current standards of quality in delivering
food service." 2 0 Additionally, the Kentucky Department of Corrections
conducted an extensive examination of its food services contract with
Aramark, revealing numerous improprieties. 2 1 For example, despite the
fact that the parties' contract specifically required Aramark to disclose
documents to the state for purposes of a financial audit and public
transparency, Aramark refused to do so at the state's request. 22 Further, the
audit revealed numerous instances of Aramark making unauthorized food
substitutions and using improper quantities of ingredients.23 The audit
revealed several other examples of Aramark cutting corners in order to
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. PAUL C. DECKER & DONALD L. MILLER, FLA. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, COST-
VALUE ANALYSIS: ARAMARK FOOD SERVICE CONTRACT C 1927 4-5 (2007), available at
http://www.privateci.org/privatepics/Aramarkfinal.pdf (noting that during the bid
process, Aramark inquired, "[m]ay ground turkey be used to replace ground beef in
recipes?" The Florida Department of Corrections responded negatively, stating that
"[i]f the recipe specifies ground beef, then ground beef must be used." Despite this, the
audit found that Aramark had "virtually eliminated" ground beef from the menu,
frequently substituting it with ground turkey).
20. Id.
21. See generally CRIT LUALLEN, KY. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, EXAMINATION OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS' FOOD SERVICES CONTRACT WITH
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC (2010), available at http://apps.auditor.
ky.gov/Public/Audit Reports/Archive/201 OARAMARKreport.pdf
22. Id. at 9-10 (citing provisions of the parties' contract, stating that Aramark agrees
that "the Contracting Agency, the Finance and Administration Cabinet, the Auditor of
Public Accounts, and the Legislative Research Commission, or their duly authorized
representatives, shall have access to any books, documents, papers, records, or other
evidence, which are directly pertinent to the Contract(s) for the purpose of financial
audit or program review").
23. Id. at 19-20 (noting an instance in which Aramark substituted "[flour pieces of
brownie . . . for a meat" and another "in which the recipe called for 1501bs of beans, but
only 100lbs were used").
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further its own pecuniary interest. 24 Finally, as its contracts with state
corrections departments often compensate Aramark based on the number of
inmates housed in the prison rather than the total number of meals actually
served, Aramark has little financial incentive to produce meals that inmates
25actually want to consume.
Lastly, one may be fairly tempted to apportion much of the blame for
these unfortunate situations to the individual states for contracting with
Aramark despite these complaints and lawsuits. However, Aramark
frequently includes provisions in its prison food services contracts which
would give the appearance of propriety and therefore induce states into
believing that Aramark will adhere to accepted standards of decency when
providing food to inmates. Unfortunately, it seems that Aramark includes
these provisions, at least in part, for the purpose of appearances, as it often
displays a lack of fidelity to these safeguards. For example, when Aramark
contracted with the Kentucky Department of Corrections, it conducted a
review of its master menu with both its own and the state's dieticians in
order to ensure that all meals were of suitable nutritional value to the
inmates. 26  However, a subsequent audit of Aramark's food service
practices discovered numerous instances in which Aramark deliberately
27avoided following this mutually agreed upon master menu. Similarly, as
a term of the parties' contract, Aramark agreed to prepare all of its meals in
24. Id. (noting the following: Aramark billed for a substantially higher rate of
kosher meals than appeared necessary; Aramark stored leftover food well beyond
acceptable timeframes;. Aramark violated the terms of the contract by paying
substantially less than fair market value for inmate grown food; Aramark frequently
stored food at temperatures below its own guidelines; a significant amount of food
preparation equipment required repairs, including thirteen pending repairs at one
institution alone; and Aramark failed to address identified sanitation issues).
25. JIM PETRO, OHIO DEP'T OF REHAB. CORRECTIONS, ARAMARK CONTRACT AND
THE COLLEGE PROGRAMS: SPECIAL AUDIT 7, available at http://www.plunderbund.
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/AramarkAudit2001.pdf (noting that Aramark's
contract with a prison in Ohio permitted it to bill the state under the assumption that
90% of its inmates consumed three meals a day despite findings that only 64% of
inmates attended the meals made available to them).
26. Ward v. Aramark Corrections Food Serv., No. 3:09-CV-00802, WL 1833312, at
*2 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2012).
27. LUALLEN, Ky. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 18-20 (noting that
Aramark frequently substituted ingredients without approval, did not provide written
documentation to the Kentucky Department of Corrections of any of the 142 instances
in which it substituted ingredients, often substituted foods for other foods that were not
even in the same food category, left certain spices entirely out of recipes and
dramatically reduced or omitted flour, beef base, and other bulk food ingredients from
recipes).
280 [VOL. 9
2013] UNDER-REGULATION IN THE STATE PRISON FOOD SYSTEM
28accordance with the Florida Department of Corrections' master menu.
Despite a contractual obligation to refrain from doing so, Aramark
methodically substituted ground beef with turkey and turkey breast with
"turkey ends and pieces" over a nearly two year period, pocketing an
estimated $4.9 million windfall in the process. 2 9  These instances
demonstrate that states likely have not tacitly agreed to Aramark's
impropriety upon contracting with it. Rather, Aramark promises these
states compliance to certain nutritional standards, but deliberately fails to
adhere to those standards for the purpose of reaping pecuniary gains.
B. Illinois' Soy Substitution
These unhealthy conditions do not only manifest when commercial
entities contract to handle food distribution for prisons; deplorable food
conditions arise in prisons when the state itself is responsible for procuring
and preparing food as well. Perhaps the most systematic, statewide
example of this exists in Illinois. 3 0 Due to budgetary constraints, Illinois
began substituting meat for soy-based products in inmate meals on a large
scale basis in 2003. While one could certainly construct a healthy diet
entirely absent of meat, Illinois' reliance on soy in inmate meals has
resulted in inmates routinely consuming approximately four times the daily
recommended quantity of soy for a healthy diet. 32 More than two-hundred
inmates in Illinois have come forward with complaints stemming from the
soy heavy diet, claiming health consequences that run the proverbial
gamut: digestive disorders, skin problems, and even breast development in
males.33 A number of these inmates have filed lawsuits against the state for
these grievances. 34 One former Illinois inmate who ate the soy heavy diet
even claimed that prison doctors recognized that the imbalanced diet may
be the cause of his and other inmates' poor health conditions and lamented
28. DECKER& MILLER, FLA. DEP'TOF CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 2.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Andrea Billups, Soy Diet Prompts Prisoners' Lawsuit, WASHINGTON TIMES,




33. Hartke, supra note 5.
34. See generally, e.g., Garcia v. W. Correctional Ctr., No. I 1-CV-3420, 2012 WL
589039 (C.D. 111. Feb. 22, 2012) (noting that the court was unaware of any prisoner's
claim seeking a soy-free diet in that district succeeding); Smith v. Illinois, No. 13-cv-
220-JPG, 2013 WL 13311818 (S.D. Ill. April 2, 2013); Wheeler v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., No. 11-CV-0839-MJR-SCW, 2012 WL 3308874 (S.D. 111. Aug. 13,
2012).
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the fact that they could do nothing to change it.35 Further, Illinois does not
provide inmates suffering from soy intolerance with alternative rations and
thus these inmates must rely on the commissary as their primary method of
sustenance, which prisons traditionally stock with many nutrient poor
36items.
C. Alabama's Prison Food Funding Statute
Illinois is not the only state that has permited pecuniary
considerations to take precedence over inmates' health concerns. One 1939
Alabama statute allocates each county's sheriff a fixed amount of money
per day for the procurement of food for the county's inmates.37 Another
statute provides that a sum of money intended to cover food service shall
be disbursed to each county's sheriff based on the number of inmates
located in the prison, in addition to the money disbursed for the cost of the
food itself." Alabama's Office of the Attorney General has construed this
statute as permitting "any surplus in the sheriffs food service allowance [to
be] retained by the sheriffs office unless the county commission has
directed" otherwise.39
While not explicitly permitting a sheriff to personally benefit
financially from this disbursements, the type of abuse and corruption that
could arise from this system is plainly obvious. In fact, it has manifested
itself on several occasions, including one in which two sheriffs each
contributed $500 to purchase a tractor-trailer load of hot dogs and served
them "at each meal until they had been depleted" (emphasis in original).40
It is a fundamental concept of health that nutritional deficiencies abound
when an individual consumes the same food exclusively over significant
period of time, especially a food as nutrient poor as hot dogs.4 1 In fact, a
U.S. District Court found Sheriff Greg Bartlett of Morgan County,
35. Billups, supra note 30.
36. Laura A. Bischoff, Ohio Inmates Spent $38 Million on Essentials, Junk Food,
CORRECTIONSONE, Jan. 23, 2012, http://www.correctionsone.com/corrections/articles/
4966936-Ohio-inmates-spent-38M-on-essentials-junk-food (noting that carbonated
beverages, candy, and ramen noodles are among the most frequently purchased
commissary items among Ohio's 50,000 inmates).
37. ALA. CODE § 14-6-42 (2013).
38. ALA. CODE§ 16-6-43 (2013).
39. Sheriffs - Meals - Funds - County Commissions - Prisons and Prisoners, Ala.
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2011-053 (Apr. 20, 2011).
40. Maynor v. Morgan Cnty., Ala., No. 5:01-cv-0851-UWC, at 4 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 8,
2009), available at http://www.schr.org /files/morgan findingfact.pdf.
41. See Virginia McGee, A Test of a Balanced Diet, 55 AM. J. NURSING 1386, 1386
(1955); Janet Raloff, Not so Hot Hot Dogs?, 145 Sci. NEWS 264, 264 (1994).
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Alabama guilty of consistently failing to provide a nutritionally adequate
diet, motivated by his financial incentive.42 The court made substantial
findings of fact illustrating the steps Bartlett took to reduce the quality of
the inmates' food for his own pecuniary gain.43 The most inculpatory of
these findings was that the sheriff had "deposited in excess of $200,000 to
his personal account from the funds allocated to him by the State of
Alabama and the federal government for the feeding of inmates."44
These examples illustrate the severity and potential for impropriety in
both the private and public sector that exists when legislatures essentially
leave prisons to self-regulate their inmate food policies; bottom-line budget
considerations will routinely prevail over inmate health concerns for a
segment of the population that is left with no political recourse.
III. INSUFFICIENCY OF LITIGATION AS A REMEDIAL METHOD
Currently, litigation is the primary remedial method available to
inmates who seek to vindicate their constitutional rights.45 In the prison
food context, this litigation most often takes the form of an Eighth
Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment.4 6 However, there are
four significant issues inherent in relying solely on the judicial system to
ensure that prisons supply inmates with proper food. First, the preliminary
injunction is an inadequate tool for ensuring that prisons cease potentially
unconstitutional conduct during the often lengthy litigation process.
Second, most inmates bring their claims without the assistance of an
42. Maynor, No. 5:01-cv-0851-UWC, at4.
43. Id. at 3 (noting the following: Morgan County Jail never served the inmates milk
while under Bartlett's control; the Morgan County Jail sometimes served chicken that
was not thoroughly cooked, "with a pinkish appearance and blood still showing;"
Morgan County Jail only served its inmates fruit three or four times per year; and
Morgan County Jail served meals that were "woefully insufficient to satisfy the normal
appetites of adult males").
44. Id. at 6.
45. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557-58 (2003)
(noting that inmates filed nearly 40,000 new federal lawsuits in 1995, which
constituted nineteen percent of the federal civil docket).
46. See generally, e.g., Adam Cohen, Can Food be Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, TIME, Apr. 2, 2012, http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/02/can-food-be-cruel-
and-unusual-punishment; Stephen Hudak, Florida Prisoner's Lawsuit Calls Soy Meals
'Cruel and Unusual' Punishment, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 2011, http://articles.
orlandosentinel.com/201 1-11-06/news/os-soy-prison-meals-201 11107_1 soy-foods-
soy-products-inmate-food; Bridget Thoreson, Inmate Files Lawsuit Alleging Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, JOURNAL TIMEs, Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.journaltimes.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/inmate-files-lawsuit-alleging-cruel-and-unusual
punishment/article 4d9b3 6d6-023b- 11 df-8554-001 cc4cOO2eO.html.
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attorney, diminishing the chances that a meritorious claim will succeed.
Third, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) has imposed even greater
statutory limitations on the use of the legal system as a remedial tool for
inmates. Fourth, courts have interpreted the Eighth Amendment in a
manner highly deferential to the government, facing inmates seeking to
challenge prison food practices as cruel and unusual punishment with
substantive as well as procedural obstacles to success. Consequently, sole
reliance on the court system to cure food related violations in prisons
ensures that many inmates are left with no legitimate method of recourse.
A. The Preliminary Injunction
The judicial system is unwieldy and inefficient, often leading to large
gaps in time between when a case is actually filed and the plaintiffs
ultimate day in court. For example, more than one-third of civil cases in
federal district court take more than one year to resolve and the longest
cases can take more than ten years to resolve.4 7 This would have the effect,
in the prison food context, of unjustly perpetuating potentially
unconstitutional conduct during this time period. Of course, the court
system has created a remedy for this problem, the preliminary injunction,
which allows a court to force or prevent a party from engaging in certain
conduct prior to hearing the merits of the case.48 The problem with forcing
inmates to rely heavily on preliminary injunctions to forcibly discontinue
potentially improper conduct regarding their food conditions is that, as one
would expect due to the extraordinary power they vest in the courts, the
standard for whether or not a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction
is "stringent."49 As such, it is possible that even when an inmate has a
meritorious claim the injustice will be perpetuated during the lag time
between filing the initial complaint and the ultimate decision on the merits
due to the strict standard that courts abide by when determining whether to
issue preliminary injunctions, coupled with the general disapproving
disposition that many court officials have regarding inmate pleadings.o
47. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING
IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 4 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%2OMaterials/Library/AALS,%2OCivil%2OCa
se%20Processing%20in%20the%2OFederal%2ODistrict%2OCourts.pdf.
48. Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & EcON. 573, 576 (2001).
49. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 9 (2008) (noting that a "preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never
awarded as of right").
50. Shon R. Hopwood, Slicing Through the Great Legal Gordian Knot: Ways to
Assist pro se Litigants in Their Quest for Justice, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1229
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Thus, despite the fact that courts intend preliminary injunctions to
"minimize the irreparable loss of rights" of a litigant, it would be a dubious
proposition to suggest that courts achieve this goal in regard to inmate
suits."
B. The Pro Se Problem
The second concern in solely relying on the court system to remedy
inmate food claims is that inmates generally do not have the financial
ability to hire counsel to assist them in filing their claims.5 2 Accordingly,
the U.S. government estimates that inmates file approximately two-thirds
of all pro se cases in the United States. Our legal system has significant
barriers to entry for practitioners due to its vastness and complexity and the
requisite competency often required to construct a valid and persuasive
legal argument.54 One should not be surprised then that one pro se litigant
in a federal prison commented that acting as his own advocate without any
formal legal education was like "trying to unravel the law without knowing
where the ends of the knot began." 5 The same former inmate turned law
student posits that court clerks often delay pro se complaints due to a
general contemptuous disposition toward these generally poorly drafted
documents.56
Additionally, pro se inmate litigants face other barriers to success
beyond that which non-incarcerated pro se litigants face. For example,
many prison inmates do not have access to the Internet and none have
access to valuable legal resources freely available to the non-incarcerated.57
As a consequence, prison inmates pursuing litigation pro se must often rely
(2011); Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1594 (explaining that over 80% of inmate
litigation is determined pretrial in favor of the government and less than 15% of inmate
litigation is ultimately successful).
51. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARv. L. REV.
525, 541 (1978).
52. Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1609 (noting that over 95% of inmate civil rights
cases in 2000 were filed without the assistance of counsel).
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (9th ed. 2009) (defining pro se as "one who
represents oneself in a court proceeding without assistance of a lawyer); United States
Courts, IN-DEPTH: Leveling the Playing Field: Help for Self-Filers, THE THIRD
BRANCH, July 2011, http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/1 1-07-01/IN-
DEPTH Levelingthe Playing_ Field Help for Self-Filers.aspx.
54. Reed Olsen, Dean Lueck & Michael Ransom, Why Do States Regulate
Admission to the Bar - Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 253, 261-63 (1991).
55. Hopwood, supra note 50, at 1229.
56. Id. at 1230.
57. United States Courts, supra note 53.
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exclusively on the courts to mail them paper versions of documents.
Beyond this, at least one legal scholar has substantiated his claim that
judges may not be fully sensitive to actions filed by pro se inmate litigants
and that these preconceived notions may manifest as "inclination [s] to
resolve ambiguities in pleadings against" pro se inmate litigants.59 This
predisposition of some judges against pro se inmate claims may partially
explain why judges dismiss such an abundance of inmate claims prior to
trial.60
C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
If the barriers to the judicial system by prison inmates were not high
enough previously, Congress passed the PLRA in 1996 in order to combat
the notion that inmates were overly litigious and frequently clogged the
court system with frivolous claims.6 ' The PLRA has four primary
provisions that exacerbate the problem of barriers of entry to the judicial
system for inmates.62 First, the statue imposes financial obligations in the
form of filing fees to inmates seeking to instigate litigation, even inmates
classified as in forma pauperis.6 3 By definition, one classified as informa
pauperis is indigent to the point that she is permitted to disregard filing
fees. Consequently, this obstacle is necessarily a difficult, if not
impossible, hurdle for many hopeful inmate litigants to overcome.M While
it is clear that this provision will cause a potential litigant to reconsider
prior to filing a claim with little or no merit and may well serve the purpose
of filtering out a great deal of meritless lawsuits, it is over-inclusive in that
it potentially filters out many meritorious inmate suits as well.
Second, the PLRA imposes a requirement that an inmate seeking a
claim for damages must make a prior showing of physical injury.65 While
many of the claims relevant to this analysis would be injunctive in nature
and would thus seem to fall outside of the purview of this provision, some
58. Id.
59. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 545 (1982).
60. Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1572 (noting that approximately 19% of inmate
claims are dismissed as frivolous).
61. James E. Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates as "Outsiders"
and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 187-88
(2001).
62. Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Litigation Reform Act Raises the Bar, 16 CRIM.
JUST. 10, 11 (2002).
63. Id.
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (9th ed. 2009).
65. Alexander, supra note 62, at 13.
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courts have nonetheless concluded that a claim for a violation of one's
constitutional rights is intrinsically a claim to redress mental or emotional
injury. In these courts, an inmate seeking to bring litigation claiming a
violation of her Eighth Amendment freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment, as is typically the case, would have the added burden of
proving physical injury prior to being admitted to court.67
Third, when an inmate seeks injunctive relief, the PLRA requires that
the petition for relief must be "narrowly drawn, extend[ing] no further than
necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and that the relief is the
least intrusive means necessary." 68 While such a pleading standard may
not pose an issue for an experienced attorney, as mentioned previously,
inmates bring a vast majority of these cases pro se.6 9 Consequently, the
likelihood that an inmate untrained in the nuances of the law will violate
this standard is elevated significantly.
Finally, the PLRA mandates that prisoners may not file suit regarding
prison conditions until exhausting all possible administrative remedies.70
This requirement may be particularly onerous for three reasons. First, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the exhaustion of all possible administrative
remedies is a mandatory requirement, and thus district court judges have no
discretion to waive this requirement even when equitable concerns may
demand it.7 1 Second, nine circuits have held that the district court judge
must dismiss the prisoner's suit if she has not exhausted all of her
administrative remedies prior to filing the suit, even where she exhausts all
possible administrative remedies during the course of the lawsuit. 72
Finally, the pro se status of most inmate litigants makes it unlikely that the
litigant will be aware of every administrative remedy available.
Legislators claim that they intended the PLRA merely to sift out
frivolous inmate claims and permit meritorious ones to proceed to court,
and the legitimacy of that purpose cannot be doubted due to the clear
governmental interest in judicial efficiency. However, despite its
intentions, the PLRA simply "shut[s] the courthouse doors to many
inmates" regardless of the validity of their claims.73 This can be
demonstrated by the fact that judges frequently rely on the PLRA directly
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1609.
70. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996).
71. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (2001).
72. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).
73. Schlanger, supra note 45, at 1562.
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in dismissing inmate claims.74 Legal scholars, judges, and legislators alike
have lamented this fact and members of each of these groups have joined to
call for amendment of the PLRA for these very reasons.75
D. The "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" Standard of the Eighth
Amendment
While hopeful inmate litigants face the significant aforementioned
procedural hurdles, they also face a difficult substantive obstacle in the
event that they do ultimately reach trial. As mentioned previously, an
inmate seeking to challenge the nature of the rations provided to him would
find her only recourse in the Eighth Amendment, in the form of a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court has offered no
static test in determining whether a particular punishment violates the
Eighth Amendment.76 Instead, the constitutionality of a particular prison
condition hinges on "evolving standards of decency," commensurate with
contemporary understanding of what constitutes acceptable punishment. 77
One might reasonably anticipate that such a subjective standard affords the
inmate litigant a greater chance at success due to the flexibility to make a
number of varied arguments, but Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has not
comported with this idea. Instead, the Court tends to be highly deferential
to the government in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, often relying on
state counting to determine a national consensus of acceptability in regard
to punishment, thus often subverting the need for independent Supreme
Court review.78
Beyond this deference, the Court further decreased the likelihood of
success of an inmate's food-based Eighth Amendment claim when it
announced that the "Eighth Amendment outlaws cruel and unusual
'punishments,' not 'conditions,' and the failure to alleviate a significant
risk that an official should have perceived but did not ... cannot be
74. See, e.g., Flowers v. Ahern, 650 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991-92 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
Kasiem v. Switz, 756 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Page v. Kirby, 314 F.
Supp. 2d 619, 620 (N.D.W.V. 2004).
75. Andrew W. Amend, Giving Precise Content to the Eighth Amendment: An
Assessment of the Remedial Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 143, 170 (2008).
76. Betsy M. Santini, Curtailment of Prisoners'Ability to Protect Their Right to be
Free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Post- Wilson Circuit Survey of Prison
Conditions Cases, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 423 (1993).
77. Id.
78. Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment,
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 17
(2010).
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condemned as the infliction of punishment." 79 In so holding, the Court
refused the notion that all state-created prison conditions should
presumptively be regarded as punishment for Eighth Amendment
purposes.80 Rather, an inmate litigant seeking to base her claim on prison
conditions must make two showings.8' First, she must show that she
suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation. 82  Second, the Eighth
Amendment contains an intent requirement mandating that, at minimum,
the prisoner must establish that a prison official demonstrated a subjective
"deliberate indifference" towards the prisoners' needs; mere negligence
will never suffice.83 As such, inmate litigants utilizing the Eighth
Amendment have a cross to bear in proving prison officials' subjective
awareness, particularly in regard to macro-level failures, due to their lack
of resources as incarcerated, often pro se, litigants. 84
This high Eighth Amendment standard thus serves as a final barrier to
an inmate's food-related litigation should she successfully navigate through
the aforementioned procedural difficulties.85 Where then are prisoners left
to turn to seek a remedy in the face of such limitations? The
implementation of a federal standardization of prison food law, complete
with the authorization to regulate and discipline offending institutions is the
only viable solution to ensure that the rights of our nation's incarcerated are
not routinely violated in the context of food related impropriety.
79. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
80. Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 890 (2009).
81. Id. at 889-90.
82. Id.
83. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301 (1991).
84. Dolovich, supra note 80, at 948.
85. See e.g., Stanley v. Page, 44 Fed.App'x 13 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal
of inmates' class action suit alleging that they received diminished food portions, were
denied utensils for meals, were served scrambled eggs with a greenish tint, and were
served ice cubes containing roaches; these conditions constituted "temporary
inconveniences" and not "extreme deprivations cognizable under the Eighth
Amendment"); Islam v. Jackson, 782 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Va. 1992) (dismissing
inmate's suit where he alleged that he and other inmates were served maggot infested
meat for one meal and were served food for thirteen subsequent days prepared in
unsanitary conditions, including being prepared without gloves and by individuals
without certifications or medical examinations to work with food); Tucker v. Rose, 955
F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (granting summary judgment in favor of state regarding
prisoner's allegations that the prison served food tainted by rodents because the
incidents were not frequent enough to constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation and
there was no evidence that food service managers were aware of the problem at the
time the allegedly tainted food was served).
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IV. PUBLIC SCHOOL REGULATION AS A MODEL FOR PRISONS
Section IV begins by analyzing the constitutionality of the
promulgation of federal regulations to govern state prisons. It then uses the
federal regulation of food in the public school system as a paradigm for the
federal regulation of food in the prison food context. Finally, this section
focuses on the adjustments that legislators must make in order to ensure
that these regulations function properly, taking into consideration the
difference in context between public schools and prisons. This article
assumes that this agency would promulgate standards for prison food that
would promote the good health and nutrition of inmates, as it is beyond the
scope of the article to prescribe the specific nutritional standards that would
be necessary to achieve these goals. Further, as the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (the Department) is already responsible for carrying out the
federal regulation of public school food, the proposition offered in this
article would not require the costly creation of an additional federal
agency.86 Rather, Congress could simply and logically expand the purview
of the Department to include the dominion of prison food regulation.
A. Constitutional Authority
Perhaps the most useful method of ensuring compliance with federal
prison food regulations on a local scale is one used in the context of the
public school system routinely in order to further the congressional agenda
- federal grants." While the notion of federalism traditionally leaves
education regulation to the states as a function of their general police
powers, the federal government nonetheless has a hand in forming
regulatory schemes for public schools. It accomplishes these goals through
its spending power, both providing federal grants with strings attached and
withholding federal funds in order to incentivize states to participate in its
regulatory programs." Despite the fact that Congress' ability to influence
state regulatory schemes through its spending power does indeed have
limits when taken to the extreme, Congress has "virtually unfettered
discretion to spend federal monies on projects it deems worthwhile and,
86. Clint G. Salisbury, Make an Investment in Our School Children: Increase the
Nutritional Value of School Lunch Programs, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 331, 334
(2004).
87. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K-12 EDUCATION FUNDING, http://
www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed /10facts/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
88. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
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moreover, to condition such spending as it thinks best."89 Accordingly, our
courts have interpreted the Constitution to authorize Congress to spend in
the form of grants to the states and to create federal agencies in order to
pursue its regulatory goals. 90 As such, Congress would have the ability
under the authority granted to it by the Spending Clause to effectuate the
regulation of food standards in state prison systems.
B. The National School Lunch Program and the Healthy, Hunger-
Free Kids Act of 2010
A set of regulations recently promulgated by the Department
concerning minimum required standards for nutrition in public school
systems that participate in the National School Lunch Program (the
Program), coupled with the more recent Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of
2010 (the Act) illustrates the type of comprehensive and pervasive
influence that the federal government exercises over the public school
system and could exercise over state prison systems.91 This section
specifically evaluates four critical components of the Act and its
corresponding regulations. First, as the backbone of the regulatory scheme,
they impose a set of nutritional standards upon participating schools
intended to promote proper nutrition among our nation's youth. Second,
they require substantial training and certification of food service personnel
in participating schools in order to maintain those nutritional standards.
Third, they include a periodic review process to ensure compliance with
89. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2603-04 (2012) (holding
that Congress' spending power is invalid when it amounts to a "gun to the head" of the
states); Ronald J. Kortosyzski, Jr., Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" But
Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11, 16
(1998).
90. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2601 (noting that the Supreme Court has "long recognized
that Congress may use [its spending power] to grant federal funds to the States, and
may condition such a grant upon the States' 'taking certain actions that Congress could
not require them to take') (quoting College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)).
91. Melissa D. Mortazavi, Are Food Subsidies Making Our Kids Fat - Tensions
Between the Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act and the Farm Bill, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1699, 1713-14 (2011) (stating that Congress incentivizes states to participate in
the Healthy, Hunger Free Kids Act of 2010 by increasing the federal reimbursement
rate for free lunches by six cents per meal to $2.74); ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, http://www.ers.usda.gov
/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/chi ld-nutrition-programs/national-school-lunch-
program.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (explaining that the National School Lunch
Program provided meals to over 31 million public school students per day in 2012).
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their provisions. Finally, they allow the federal government to levy fines
against states that violate their requirements for deterrent effect.
1. Nutritional Standards
The Act, which was crafted with the input of nutritionists and
dietitians in accordance with the 2010 Dietary Guidelines, explicitly states
the types of food groups and quantities of those food groups that schools
must make available at each meal in order to ensure healthy meals for
schoolchildren.92 For example, not only does the Act require participating
schools to provide vegetables as a component of each school lunch, it also
mandates that schools provide each of a number of various types of
vegetables throughout the week.93 Beyond that, the Act's standards ensure
that students receive a wide variety of vitamins and minerals, necessary to
promote a diversified and healthy diet.9 4 In addition, the federal nutrition
standards for public schools take into consideration that not all students and
age cohorts have the same nutritional demands and requirements and thus
vary the quantity required of particular food groups dependent upon the
student's age and grade level. 95 This is consistent with the fundamental
notion that all people, particularly within varying age groups, do not have
uniform caloric intake and nutritional requirements.96
2. Training and Certification
Additionally, the Act requires a system of training and certification to
ensure that food service personnel are familiar and compliant with the
included nutritional standards. 97 First, the Act mandates annual training
and certification of food service personnel in order to ensure program
compliance and integrity as well as requiring a showing of competence in
regard to the principles they learn in the training sessions. 98  The
Department determines the standards of these training and certification
92. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 4088, 4088 (Jan. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R pts. 210
and 220).
93. Id. at 4091.
94. Id. at 4094.
95. Id. at 4098.
96. R.A. McCance and E.M. Widdowson, Food Requirements and Food Intakes, 2
BRIT. MED. J. 311, 311 (1937).
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programs. 99 Further, the Act prescribes that each annual training session
must contain training modules on nutrition, health and food safety
standards and methodologies, and "any other appropriate topics, as
determined by the Secretary."100 The corresponding federal regulation also
permits the use of training as a corrective action when a particular school
violates the requisite standards.' 0 ' Because nutritional researchers
frequently uncover new and compelling data, these annual training sessions
are essential in ensuring that the standards and procedures of the Act do not
become obsolete or ineffective.102 The final section allows discretion and
flexibility on the part of the Department to tailor the training session to the
individual needs of the locality, as nutritional issues requiring remedial
attention may vary from state to state, and even city to city. 103
3. Review Processes
While training and certification are critical to the effectiveness of
public school food regulation, any rule is only as good as its enforcement
mechanism. The federal government imposes a number of review and
enforcement mechanisms to ensure public schools' compliance with its
nutritional standards.104 First, the federal government enlists state agencies
to conduct administrative reviews, ensuring that they review each school
for compliance at least once during every five year review cycle, but in no
circumstances shall a school avoid review for longer than six consecutive
years.' Much of the review process is concerned with ensuring that
schools spend federal funds pursuant to the regulations and also to ensure
that schools do not claim more funds than needed to operate the Program,
in an attempt to defraud the federal government.106
However, a significant portion of the review process is also focused
on ensuring that participating schools adhere to the nutritional standards
99. Id
100. Id.
101. 7 C.F.R. § 210.18 (2012).
102. CAROLE DAVIS & ETTA SALTOS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Dietary
Recommendations and How They Have Changed Over Time in AMERICA'S EATING
HABITS: CHANGES AND CONSEQUENCES 33-50 (1999) (describing how prevailing
notions of what constitutes prudent nutrition have evolved over time as new nutritional
research becomes available).
103. Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-296 § 306, 124 Stat.
3183, 3243 (2010).
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promulgated by these regulations. 10 7 For example, the Act instructs the
reviewing agency to "[c]onduct a weighted nutrient analysis of the
meals .. . to determine whether the meals offered meet the calorie, sodium,
and saturated fat requirements" stated previously in the regulations.'0o In
addition, the reviewing agency is responsible for reviewing "nutrition
labeling or manufacturer specifications for products or ingredients used to
prepare school meals to verify they contain zero grams . . . of trans fat per
serving."' 09 As such, the Act charges the reviewing agency with ensuring
schools' compliance with a strict set of criteria in order to make an
assessment as to whether or not each school abides satisfactorily by the
terms of the regulations."o
4. Penalties
However, it is not enough simply to charge an agency with the
responsibility of identifying violations; the proposed act must impose a
system of penalties in order to deter prisons from violating of the
regulations."' According to the current system of regulations for public
schools, a school that has violated any provision of the Program is not
immediately penalized for its transgression, but rather then becomes
subject to a follow-up review.1 12 During the interim between the violation
and the follow-up review the regulations provide the school with an
opportunity to rectify its violation.l13 However, if upon follow-up review
the school has still not cured the issue, a number of remedial procedures are
possible.114 These remedial procedures include requiring the school food
authority to resolve the problems complete with documentation of the
corrective action taken, the taking of corrective fiscal actions, and the
withholding of payments under the program.'
Further, and perhaps most persuasively to the participating schools,
the Act imposes a system of fines to be assessed to the school upon a
determination that the school either failed to correct a severe





111. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 237 (2000).
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which the school food authority or school had been informed, or failed to
correct repeated violations of program requirements.1 6 Arguably more
importantly, the Act also prescribes the amount of the fines that reviewing
agencies can accord to the states, capping the fine at a maximum of ten
percent of the funds made available to the state under the program.117
C. Comparing Public Schools to Prisons
Upon first glance, one might reasonably reject the notion that these
two institutions with such seemingly diametrically opposed goals, public
schools and prisons, could be so related so as to justify the implementation
of similar regulatory schemes. However when one considers the facts more
closely, that they are both largely state funded and operated, they both
demand highly controlled and supervised environments, and they both
subject their primarily involuntary inhabitants to rigid routines, the
comparison seems far less attenuated.' 18  Beyond this, due to the high
operating costs of both establishments and their substantial impact on the
general welfare, governments have limited viable alternatives to both
schools and prisons."' 9 In fact, the need for pervasive regulation in the
prison food system exceeds that of the public school system since, unlike
schoolchildren, inmates do not have the option of providing their own food.
As such, one may fairly conclude that Congress can and should expect a
similar regulatory scheme that is effective to control food quality in our
public schools to serve as an archetype that may be applied with efficacy to
the prison setting.
D. Necessary Alterations for the Prison Context
Of course, Congress cannot simply apply the preexisting regulatory
scheme in public schools to the prison context identically. This section
identifies and analyzes the necessary alterations that Congress would have
to make to the public school food paradigm in order to ensure effectiveness
in the prison food system. Further, this section examines the monetary
116. Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-296 § 303, 124 Stat.
3183 (2010).
117. Id.
118. Wayne K. Hoy, Organizational Socialization: The Student Teacher and Pupil
Control ideology, 61 J. EDUC. RES. 153, 153-54 (1967).
119. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, WHY WE STILL NEED PUBLIC SCHOOLS - PUBLIC
EDUCATION FOR THE COMMON GOOD 7-13 (2007), available at http://www.cep-
dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentlD=291 (follow "Full Report" hyperlink);
Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 340-41 (2001).
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feasibility of implementing such a regulatory scheme and of making the
necessary alterations to tailor them to the prison context. In doing so, this
section mirrors section IV.B in focusing on nutritional standards, training
and certification, review processes, and penalties.
1. Nutritional Standards
Congress could not directly translate the nutritional standards of the
Act and the Program to the prison context due to the obvious distinction
between the variation in nutritional requirements between children and
adults, and an amended version of these standards would certainly have its
place in the prison system. If the Act recognizes the necessity to
accommodate differences in standards among age groups in the public
school setting, which only vary from five to eighteen, it only follows that
prison food regulations would need to make the same, and perhaps even
more regimented, distinctions in a system feeds inhabitants comprising a
far wider gap in age.120 While making the necessary adjustments to the
current public school regulation in this regard to make it viable for prison
inmates would incur some cost through hiring registered dietitians to tailor
food group requirements to various adult age cohorts, the cost would be
negligible when compared to the health benefits generated. 12 1 Further, it is
possible that much of these costs could be offset by a reduction in prison
health care costs, as the inverse correlation between good nutrition and
health care costs is well documented, particularly in regard to reducing the
average length of stay of patients.122
2. Training and Certification
The implementation of a training and certification program similar to
the Act would be essential to the success of the program in a prison setting.
Taking into consideration the fact that Congress has yet to place federal
standards in the prison food system despite the obvious and empirical need
for them, it would be far too easy for them to effectuate a system of
standards and guidelines and then neglect it for years at a time, allowing
120. See generally A. Stewart Truswell, Adults Young and Old, 291 BRIT. MED. J.
466 (1985) (standing for the general proposition that nutritional requirements for adults
change as they age).
121. D.C. Hemingway, Good Nutrition Lowers Health Care Costs, 7 J.
ORTHOMOLECULAR MED. 67, 68 (1992) (stating that patients showing signs of
nutritional deficiency have ninety-eight percent longer average lengths of stay in
hospitals than those patients displaying no such signs).
122. Id.
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the provisions therein to become obsolete. Certainly, one might expect that
the propensity for this to happen in a prison context would be substantially
greater than in a school setting since schoolchildren have the benefit of the
political lobbying power of their parents to ensure that their interests are
represented. 12 3  Inmates generally do not have the benefit of the same
political protection; in fact, powerful interest groups routinely lobby for
interests diametrically opposed to those of the incarcerated.12 4
Consequently, this proposed act would require stricter training and
certification standards than those currently in place in public schools.
Otherwise, the risk of ignoring advances in nutritional science and the
general degradation of food service officials' knowledge base would be far
too great.125
3. Review Processes
While the review process is certainly an essential element of any
regulatory scheme, the prison food system would require no substantial
departures from the preexisting public school regulatory system in regard
to review in order to be effective. A schedule requiring review at least
once during every five year period allows for enough deterrence in
oversight without imposing the significant costs that would accompany
more frequent review.126 It is important that review must occur at least
once per five year review cycle, allowing for the possibility of more
frequent review.
One may argue that such an infrequent review process coupled with
prior notice of an impending review increases the possibility that a prison
may engage in detection avoidance and conceal its violations during the
123. See, e.g., Andrea Eger, Tulsa-area Parent Group Lobbying for Graduation
Requirement Changes; Good Students Could be Denied Diplomas, TULSA WORLD,
Mar. 2, 2012, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/education/tulsa-area-parent-group-
lobbying-for-graduation-requirement-changes-good/article cl e7b7d9-4a40-50f1 -935a-
255e720aa66d.html; Steve Stoler, Parents Lobby for Downtown Dallas School Zone,
WFAA, Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.wfaa.com/news/education /Parents-lobby-for-
downtown-Dallas-school-zone-i 69384946.html.
124. Harvey Silvergate & Kyle Smeallie, Freedom Watch: Jailhouse Bloc, THE
PHOENIX, Dec. 9, 2008, http://thephoenix.com/Boston/News/73092-Freedom-watch-
Jailhouse-bloc/?page=3#TOPCONTENT (explaining that the Corrections Corporation
of America, the country's largest private prison provider, spent more than $2.7 million
in the period between 2006 and September of 2008 lobbying for stricter laws in order
to keep their prisons occupied).
125. See supra p. 19.
126. See supra pp. 21-22.
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review period.12 7 However, this ignores the inherent cost associated with
detection avoidance.128 From a prison's perspective "there is little
difference between a dollar of sanction . .. and a dollar spent avoiding that
sanction."1 29 Consequently, it would be financially illogical for prisons to
expend significant resources to avoid detection despite the fact that review
occurs fairly infrequently. As such, the proposed prison regulatory scheme
could adopt the review processes currently in use for the public school
system with no significant substantive change, contributing further to the
cost-effectiveness of implementation.
4. Penalties
A significant divergence from the public school model in regard to
penalties would be in order for this regulatory scheme to work effectively
in a prison context. 3 0 The maximum fine of ten percent of all funding
received for violations currently imposed by the Act, while certainly a
tremendous amount of money when dealing with a program of this
magnitude, may be inadequate to effectively deter prisons from violating
the provisions of such regulations.' 3 1 This is due to the idea that if fines are
not set at a sufficiently high level, a rationally thinking, profit motivated
entity, even a state government, may be willing to continue its current
prison food scheme, even under the threat of sanction, because of the
uncertainty that a reviewing agency will actually discover its violations and
the vast sums of money that it could save by continuing to cut corners.132
This notion mirrors the fundamental yet poignant law and economics
idea that "a particular damage measure provides a particular degree of
incentive to perform, and in general, it is evident that the higher is the
127. 7 C.F.R. § 210.18 (2012).
128. Chris Williams Sanchricho, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1361
(2006).
129. Id.
130. Mortazavi, supra note 91, at 1732 (noting that there is even evidence that the
current enforcement mechanisms in the public school context are ineffective,
suggesting that penalties in the prison context may need to substantially increased in
order to ensure efficacy).
131. Donald C. Klawiter, After the Deluge: The Powerful Effect of Substantial
Criminal Fines, Imprisonment, and Other Penalties in the Age of International Cartel
Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. R. 745, 757 (2001) (noting that "it appears certain"
that blockbuster fines in the area of antitrust violations are substantially more effective
than the previous, more limited fines).
132. Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 880 (2012)
(concluding that the probability of detection and the harm from the violation should lie
at the center of an agency's calculation of penalties).
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damage measure, the greater incentive to perform."l 3 3 In effect, the amount
of money that a state could save through continuing to cut corners coupled
with an accounting for the uncertainty of enforcement may lead to a
scenario where the perceived savings through non-compliance exceeds the
highest currently available monetary penalty.134 Accordingly, the penalties
currently utilized for federal programs involving public school food would
likely be insufficient to serve the purpose of deterrence in a prison setting.
The implementation of a severe fine for infractions may also have the
added benefit of encouraging self-reporting, mitigating some enforcement
costs and contributing to the overall cost-effectiveness of the program. 35
This makes more severe fines a preferable alternative to more frequent
review. Prescribing an exact figure of what a sufficient penalty should look
like without complete information and data would prove to be a nearly
impossible task. However, the proposed act should set the optimal fine at
some figure beyond the total cost that a state can save through non-
compliance, adjusting for the chance of enforcement, a function of the total
resources devoted to enforcing the scheme.' 36
As such, while the Act and the Program serve as a foundation for the
implementation of a regulatory scheme for food in the prison context,
legislators would have to impose some significant modifications in order to
ensure an effective regulatory scheme in the prison context. First, the
differences in physiology and nutritional requirements between children
and adults demand more finely tailored nutritional standards. Second,
more frequent training and certification sessions will ensure that nutritional
standards do not become quickly outdated. Finally, a proper prison food
regulatory scheme would require harsher monetary penalties in order to
ensure compliance. While these modifications would incur some cost, the
overall regulatory scheme would be cost-effective, particularly when one
considers potential savings in regard to health care costs for inmates.
133. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 305 (2004).
134. Id. at 306.
135. Klawiter, supra note 131, at 762 (noting that when criminal fines are high
enough in the context of antitrust violations, companies are eager to self report if this
means a reduced penalty).
136. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON.169 (1968) (making the case that actual penalties should be set at a
level substantially beyond the amount of harm done through noncompliance. If set
appropriately, the same level of deterrence could still be achieved in this way, while
saving a substantial amount of social resources through reduced enforcement
expenditures).
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V. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
It seems clear that the implementation of nationwide, federal
standards for prison food is not only a feasible goal, but may even be
socially and economically beneficial in many ways. However, several
obstacles stand in the way of imposing a food based federal regulatory
scheme in state prisons. This section reviews these obstacles and suggests
ways in which each might be ameliorated. First, widespread
disenfranchisement of felons leaves politicians with little incentive to
concern themselves with inmates' needs and desires. Second, the
popularization of "tough on crime" policies gives non-felon political
constituents little motivation to pressure their legislators into passing laws
intended to benefit the incarcerated. Finally, deep-seated notions of
federalism dictate that state governments, not Congress, should be
responsible for prison related policies.
A. Felon Disenfranchisement and Socioeconomic Trends in Voting
Patterns
It is a cornerstone of any democracy that the right to vote of all
citizens is essential.137 Alexis de Tocqueville echoed this sentiment when
he wrote that "[w]hen a nation begins to modify the elective qualification,
it may easily be foreseen sooner or later, that qualification will be entirely
abolished."' 3 8 Despite this, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the right of
states to disenfranchise felons, contending that, "the exclusion of felons
from the vote has an affirmative sanction in the Fourteenth Amendment."' 39
Consequently, state legislatures have rescinded the right to vote of nearly
six million Americans nationwide.140  While some states have no
restrictions or limited restrictions on felons' right to vote, other states have
particularly onerous policies.141 For example, in Florida, over 10% of the
137. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (stating that "[n]o right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make
the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live").
138. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 71 (Henry Reeve trans., vol.
1, 1898).
139. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality
of the disenfranchisement of felons).
140. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & JEFF MANZA, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2010 1 (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
fd State Level Estimates of Felon Disen 2010.pdf.
141. Id. at 6.
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adult voting age population lacks the ability to cast a vote at the ballot box
due to its stringent disenfranchisement laws. 14 2
Beyond felon disenfranchisement, those individuals that are likely to
vote to protect inmates' interests, namely their family members, are those
individuals that traditionally are underrepresented in the political process; a
byproduct of inherent racial and socioeconomic disparities in the prison
population. For example, African Americans represent only approximately
12% of the United States population, but 40% of the total prison
population; a product of incarceration at a rate of 5.6 times that of their
white counterparts.14 3 Hispanics, as well, are incarcerated at a rate of 1.8
times that of whites.144 Additionally, data show that enfranchised African
Americans and Hispanics generally vote at a substantially lower rate than
do whites.145
As a consequence of felon disenfranchisement and socioeconomic
trends in the voting patterns of those voters likely to sympathize with the
interests of inmates, legislators have very little self-interest in passing laws
concerned with the improving prison conditions.146 As "legislative
elections are devices . . . for translating . .. citizen desires into legislative
action," where the electoral system bars a particular class of individuals
from participating in the election process, it is clear that legislative
responsiveness to that class will be diminished.14 7  Felon
disenfranchisement thus poses perhaps the most significant barrier to the
implementation of a federal regulatory scheme devoted to the
standardization of prison food.
In order to overcome this hurdle, interest groups such as the American
Civil Liberties Union must mobilize to advocate more ardently for
prisoners' political rights. Further, these interest groups must zealously
support the movement toward felon re-enfranchisement. The political
resources of powerful interest groups coupled with the general citizenry's
support of reinstating an inmate's right to vote after her release from
142. Id.
143. Brett E. Garland, Cassia Spohn & Eric J. Wodahl, Racial Disproportionality in
the American Prison Population: Using the Blumstein Method to Address the Critical
Race and Justice Issue of the 21st Century, 5 JUST. POL'Y J. 2, 4 (2008).
144. Id.
145. THOM FILE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE
VOTING RATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT
ELECTIONS) 3 (2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf.
146. Debra Parks, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 71, 100 (2003) (noting
that "[p]risoners are no politician's constituents").
147. Lyn Ragsdale, Responsiveness and Legislative Elections: Toward a
Comparative Study, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 339, 341 (1983).
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incarceration could make substantial inroads toward improving felon
participation in the political process.14 8  Increased public awareness of
prison food conditions may also engender increased political sympathy
from enfranchised Americans, forcing legislators to take action in regard to
prison food conditions. Finally, increased awareness on the part of
Democratic Party politicians that "felon disenfranchisement erodes the
Democratic voting base" may encourage those politicians to unite to
support the repudiation of felon disenfranchisement laws, thus increasing
the likelihood that the proposed federal prison food regulations may reach
fruition.149
B. "Tough on Crime" Political Landscape
The public and political disposition toward harsh penalties for those
who violate the law, often referred to as the "tough on crime" movement,
also poses a significant threat to the imposition of the proposed federal
prison food regulatory scheme. 5 0 The war on drugs, coupled with the
politicization of crime, has resulted in a political landscape in which
constituents extol the virtues of acute penalties on lawbreakers. 1' As a
result, American law enforcement policies have produced a retributive
system that incarcerates its citizens at a rate five to eight times that of most
other industrialized nations.15 2  Consequently, it may pose exceedingly
difficult to engender enough public support for a federal food regulatory
scheme to make the implementation of such a scheme feasible.
Falling crime rates since the inception of the war on crime have led
many to the reasonable conclusion that the war on crime caused this
decline. However, some have suggested that this may be a simple case
148. Shawn Macomber, Re-enfranchising Felons, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 2, 2005,
http://spectator.org/archives /2005/03/02/re-enfranchising-felons (noting that a July
2002 Harris poll found that 80% of Americans believe that all ex-felons who have
completed their sentences should be allowed to vote and that 60% of Americans
believe that felons finished with their sentence but on probation or parole likewise
should have the right to vote).
149. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REV.
777, 780 (2002) (explaining that "African Americans are overwhelmingly Democratic
Party voters" and thus felon disenfranchisement disproportionately affects Democratic
politicians, as opposed to Republican politicians).
150. See generally, K.L. Mclff, Getting Smart as Well as Tough on Crime, 11 UTAH
B. J.41 (1998).
151. Marc Mauer, Why are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 9, 13 (1999).
152. Id. at 9.
153. Id.
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of correlation and not causation. 15 4 For example, one staple of the war on
crime is the increase of mandatory sentences.'55  One legal scholar
determined that these mandatory sentences have produced "severe,
unevenly imposed sentences that have little effect on crime" instead of the
deterrent effect that legislators intended.15 6 Similarly, more affordable and
higher quality cocaine, heroin, and marijuana is available today than was
available prior to the war on drugs.'57 Increased public awareness of these
findings, that "tough on crime" policies may not produce the effects that
voters believe, may cause constituents to renounce their strict beliefs about
proper punishment for lawbreakers. Then, inducing voters to support a
regulatory scheme concerned with the rights and interests of inmates would
prove far less challenging.
C. Federalism and the States' Police Powers
Federalism, the traditional division of powers between state and
federal governments in America, also stands as a potential roadblock to the
implementation of a federal prison food regulatory scheme.' While the
dichotomy between states' power and federal power is often debated "the
Founders undeniably left [police powers] reposed in the States and denied
the central Government [the regulation of] the suppression of violent crime
and vindication of its victims." 59 Consequently, the Supreme Court has
seemed to have made an emphatic statement that states should maintain
dominion over general concerns over the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare of their citizens. As prison conditions would undeniably fall within
the purview of police powers, one is left reconsidering the constitutionality
of a federal prison food regulatory scheme.
However, the Court's statement in Morrison has proven less absolute
than it may otherwise appear, leaving open the door for federal regulation
of state penitentiaries. For example, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (the Act) requires that "[n]o government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in
154. Id.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Mitchell F. Crusto, The Supreme Court's New Federalism: An Anti-Rights
Agenda, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 517, 522 (2000) (defining federalism as "our system of
government, formed by a compact between and among the federal government and the
state governments, wherein the states have surrendered their individual sovereignty to a
central authority but retain limited residuary powers of government").
159. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).
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or confined to an institution," including those housed in state
penitentiaries.160 Despite the fact that this federal law clearly infringes on
the states' police powers to control the conditions of their own prisons, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Cutter v. Wilkinson.16 1
Consequently, while federalism and the reservation of police powers to the
states might appear at first glance to provide a substantial obstacle to a
federal prison food regulatory scheme, the Court has been inconsistent in
its holdings and the potential for such a scheme remains viable.
Felon disenfranchisement and socioeconomic trends in voting
patterns, the recent increase of "tough on crime" legislation, and basic ideas
of federalism all pose substantial threats to the feasibility of implementing
the proposed regulatory scheme. These obstacles are not insurmountable,
however. A number of solutions to these problems are available and their
adoption will pave the way for the federal regulation of state prison food.
VI. CONCLUSION
The prison food system is an anomaly in modern political America, as
it lacks many of the stringent regulations that have become ordinary in
virtually every facet of our lives. Section II surveyed how this under-
regulation has resulted in significant health related issues for inmates, as
both individual states and large corporate food contractors, such as
Aramark, routinely take advantage of the lack of accountability in prison
food provision for their own financial benefit. These health-related issues
range from simply providing inadequate amounts of food to providing
meals that lack the same nutritional standards that are provided in other
public settings, such as public schools. The issue is amplified in the prison
context based on the lack of alternatives that inmates have to rely on in the
face of insufficient provisions.
Section III then analyzed the adequacy of litigation as a remedial tool
for inmates the current to inmates to cure any perceived injustices they may
have endured pertaining to improper food service. Taking into
consideration the lengthy litigation process, the fact that many inmates
must proceed pro se due to their indigent status and a general underlying
perception that inmate claims are frivolous, it is clear that relying on
litigation as the sole corrective mechanism is a virtual assurance of the
perpetuation of these unjust food practices. Additionally, Congress
adopted the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996, which provided further
160. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I(a)
(2000).
161. See generally, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
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barriers to inmates seeking to utilize the court system. Finally, Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence serves as a substantive barrier to the hopeful
inmate litigant even if she navigates the aforementioned procedural
difficulties.
Since many states evidently will not take the initiative to solve the
issue independently and the litigation system alone is insufficient to solve
the problem, it is obvious that pervasive and stringent federal standards are
needed. Section IV proposed a federal regulatory scheme to standardize
prison food using preexisting federal regulations for public school food as a
paradigm. Some substantive and administrative alterations would have to
be incorporated to adjust for the change in demographic and setting, such
as more narrowly tailored, age-specific nutrition plans and increased
penalties for noncompliance. However, the general framework could
remain intact. Further, section IV explored the notion that such a policy
may actually be economically beneficial for states based on an expected
reduction in inmate health care costs.
Section V then analyzed a number of practical barriers to the
implementation of a federal prison food regulatory scheme in state prisons.
Felon disenfranchisement and socioeconomic trends in voting patterns
ensure that inmates' interests fall through the cracks of political discourse.
The recent proliferation of "tough on crime" legislation dissuades the
citizenry from championing the rights of inmates. Finally, traditional
notions of federalism may leave regulation of state prisons to the sole
authority of individual state governments. Section V then proposed a
number of solutions to each of these potential obstacles.
In conclusion, it seems an unfortunate political reality that the only
realistic solution to these problems is strict, interventionist legislation.
Otherwise, the pleas of this class of individuals with "no political
constituency" will continue to fall on deaf ears.16 2
162. Esteemed legal scholar Erwin Chemerisnky has been quoted as saying that
inmates, "get no protection from the political process. They have no political
constituency." Robertson, supra note 61, at 203.
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